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* To understand the nature, scope, and purpose of EU competition policy.
* To describe competition between companies and its economic importance.
* To outline EU competition legislation and identify the policy contradictions.




The establishment of the single market has led to increased competition between european business, with the free movement of goods, services, labour, and capital. We have noted in the Single Market section that Cecchini had predicted substantial economic benefits for Europe as firms restructured and achieved economies of scale. However the advantages of market integration may not be realised without an adequate competition policy, which seeks to eradicate certain undesirable business practices.		

What is Competition Policy?





Competition can be said to exist when companies operating in the same market are free to exploit their different production costs, prices, and quality. In order for this to take place firms need to be free to advertise their goods and services without excessive interference from government. In addition companies need to be free from tying clauses (where companies make special agreements with customers or distributors ) and be able to enter or exit the market relatively easily. Also there must be no special arrangements between two or more firms in an industry. It is these kind of issues that competition policy seeks to address.

































In general, competition policy seeks to approximate conditions of perfect competition or monopolistic competition, since these market structures lead to better technical efficiency. The consumer enjoys more choice, lower prices, and the economy benefits from the improved competitiveness. However, it may be possible to achieve these objectives through a monopoly or oligopolistic market structure if ‘dynamic efficiency’ is established.  If the firm achieves economies of scale, as a result of the size of the company, and technological advances which improve costs, as a result previous abnormal profits, then it may be possible to achieve even lower prices and increased output than under conditions of perfect competition.  Sometimes it may be appropriate to break up a monopoly market structure in order to create allocative and technical efficiency and on other occasions it is more appropriate to leave the companies untouched. 

European vs National Legislation





The Commission has had to reconcile two seemingly contradictory objectives: Firstly to allow firms to restructure and merge in order to compete more effectively with the United States and the Far East and, secondly, to ensure that the newly restructured firms do not employ practices that harm the consumer or inhibit some of the benefits that competition should bring. The main ways in which competition is restricted in Europe are through restrictive practices, market domination, state aids, and through public procurement restrictions. All of these issues are dealt with in the legislation.  The Treaty of Rome and the Single European Act contain much of the legislation that relates to competition and the major aspects of these EU laws will be examined in turn in conjunction with a new merger policy adopted in 1990.

The Single European Act





This aspect of the legislation relates to restrictive practices.  Under article 85 agreements or practices which affect intra-community trade or distort fair competition are explicitly prohibited. The Article identifies five main types of arrangements which should be condemned:

* price-fixing arrangements (direct or indirect)
* arrangements which limit technical or productive development or those which control the market
* arrangements which share out markets between independent suppliers
* the application of different terms on different buyers of the same product 
* arrangements which demand tying clauses between suppliers and buyers

Yet there are a number of exemptions that apply if the agreement contributes to and is essential for:

* improved conditions of production and distribution
* improved economic and technical performance
* better consumer welfare

If these conditions of Art 85(3) are met then block exemptions may result. This has been applied to a number of cases which cover, for example, patent licensing, and research and development. Exclusive distribution arrangements are also allowed as long as ‘parallel imports’ are not hindered. Exclusive purchasing agreements are allowed subject to some restrictions. Also some specialisation agreements are allowed if they help small to medium sized firms rationalise production.

Application of Article 85 (81)

EC plastics cartel involving 23 of Europe's top chemical firms; 90% share of EC's supply of PVC and 80% share of the low density polyethylene market. Guilty of collusion in order to sustain profit levels (through market sharing) in an industry with severe overcapacity. During 1984-1987 120 million Ecu (£184 m) fines were imposed.
    
Tate and Lyle and British Sugar ended a 4 year price fixing agreement in 1990.





The MFF decision - involving the German milk board: Commission deemed that the MFF had distorted competition by aiding German exports to other countries. NB: Commission was wrong to use Art 85 in relation to trade in a product which formed part of a national organisation. Art 2(1) exempts the use of Art 85 in this kind of scenario. 

ARTICLE 86 (82): Dominant positions.

Art 86 (82) also applies to the restriction or distortion of competition through the abuse of monopoly positions.The Treaty of Rome states that :

“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in substantial part of it shall be prohibited as (being) incompatible with the common market inso far as it may affect trade between member states".

Definition: A dominant position in effect is a concentration of power which enables the firm to influence the outcome of the market and abuse is deemed to be, that position whereby sheer economic strength ensures the prevention of competition in the relevant market. 
It is not just through market share that such positions emanate,but through:

* behaviour which enables the firm to act independently of competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers.
* shortage situations where long standing consumers become dependent on their suppliers and competition between suppliers evaporates.

Dominant position are not prohibited per se but abuses of such but  are. Abuses of position which only have domestic effects are excluded from Community level investigations. Abuses  undertaken outside the EC which have effects within are included ie, a parent company based outside the EC can be held responsible for the actions of an independent subsidiary.

Examples of  abuse include tying clauses, inequitable prices, predatory pricing etc. Swiss company Tetrapak were fined for engaging in price discrimination between customers in 1991. Also Swiss company Hoffmann-La Roche offered fidelity rebates to customers of their vitamins in 1979 and a ruling was made against them. 

Many past cases highlight problems inherent in the application of Art 86. Two major points of focus are; the size of market share and the concept of the relevant market which sometimes can cause difficulties for investigators. During 1978, for example, there was a dispute as to whether the banana constituted its own market or whether it was part of the fresh fruit market.  
Also the article used to be used in conjunction with article 85 to regulate merger activity yet it proved to be fairly ineffective. When New York company Continental Can merged with a Dutch firm  and German firm to achieve a monopoly share of the European metal can and bottle top industry the Commission tried to prevent the process yet it was overturned by the European Court of Justice later on.

With respect to the this case, another point was also raised; that of the inability of Art 86 to deal with mergers unless an act of dominant position abuse occurred. as a direct result of this shortcoming, proposals for the regulation of mergers were put forward.

ARTICLES 90,92,93: STATE AIDS.

Article 92 states that;

" save as otherwise provided in this treaty, any aid granted by a member state..in any form..which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade between member states, be incompatible with the common market"

There are however, a number of exemptions which include:

* aid of a social character to individuals where no discrimination on the basis of origin exists
* aid related to national calamities
* aid to develop underdeveloped regions
* aid to promote projects of European interest




Bull company (computing): Commission ordered freezing of capital allocation from French govt. Commission had received information that the capital was not going towards the restructuring plan as declared.

Commission intervened in 1988 when British aerospace was planning to takeover Rover and UK government was planning to write off a debt of £800 million. Deal did proceed although the Commission forced UK to reduce the aid to £469 million.
French government were permitted to give Renault 12 billion francs in 1988 provided that the company was restructured with the money. The French have since been ordered to repay the money.

The aims of the single market will be undermined by illegal state aids as they lead to a distortion of the fair competitive environment for businesses. State aids need close monitoring if they are not to undermine the aims of increased efficiency and competitiveness.

As a consequence of the Single European Act in 1986, there has been a marked increase in cross-border mergers in the EC as a result of:

* a desire of companies to take advantage of the impact of 1992
* a general, global tendency towards mergers

The New Merger Legislation: Regulation EC - 4064/89.

Aim: to prevent the creation and enlargement of dominant market positions.

Criteria for investigation and rules of investigation:

* turnover of two or more firms in excess of 5bn Ecu
* each firm having turnover of more than 250m Ecu
* less than 2/3 of business in one EU country
* 20% stake in another firm could qualify as a merger
* Commission must be notified of bid within one week of bid
* EC has one month for preliminary enquiry
* four months to complete investigation




* no reference to the degree of concentration
* only the large firms are investigated
* both market structure and ‘public interest’ criteria are used to judge suitability of merger
* decision making procedure is slow and complex
* Shortage of specialised staff
* EU bias towards the creation of ‘Eurochampions’ (large firms that can compete effectively with the US and Japan)

Example:  Areospatiale/ De Havilland

France and Italy were upset by the decision to block a joint takeover of a Canadian aircraft manufacturer. Decision stemmed from the view that post merger scenario would be tantamount to a 'quasi-monopoly'. An argument was put forward that the market had been defined too narrowly There are signs that this policy needs to be made more specific.

Elimination of internal market barriers and merger activity should result in:

* greater allocative efficiency
* economies of scale
* improved access to innovation, new products and processes

In view of this the question could be asked whether cost savings need to be taken into consideration by competition law. So the new policy does not escape criticism.

Public Procurement and State Monopolies

Policies that relate to the regulation of state monopolies and public procurement are not always mentioned as part of European competition policy yet they have a significant impact on equitable competition.  The commission has recently initiated several programmes which are aimed at eliminating state-owned monopolies from the market place.  Article 90 recommends ‘ progressive adjustment’ leaving room for significant delays. The telecommunications industry data transmission and other services have been open to European competition but areas such as mobile telephony, public voice telephony, and infrastructure await transformation .  The privatisation of utilities in recent years has contributed to the policy objectives although the democratic deficit has led some to call for increased regulation.

In the area of public procurement the consequences for effective competition are disappointing.  In 1986 the size of the EC procurement market amounted to Ecu 530 billion of which 300 billion was tradable.  Yet it has been estimated that less than 5% of contracts are awarded to firms outside of the member state and many do not involve a competitive tender. Paolo Cecchini had estimated that the liberalisation of public procurement would lead to a cost saving of Ecu 17.5 billion (Cecchini, 1989).  In order for effective competition to exist much more needs to be accomplished.  Past regulation has been ineffective yet there have been several measures since the late eighties to redress the balance.
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